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The Dilemma of the Responsible Law Reform
Lawyer in the Post-Free Enterprise Era*
Derrick Bell**
Even in contrast to the grey, early winter day, the Colored
Crusader looked shabby. He held his weary figure erect with the
help of a long staff that had once been a spear. He seemed oblivi-
ous to my presence though he had obviously watched as I followed
the winding path up the hill on my early morning run past leafless
trees that lined barren, frozen fields. None of the books extolling
the virtues of running promised an encounter like this, but after
an initial shock, I determined to find out how this battle-weary,
Black veteran of some ancient war had escaped his classic age and
entered our era.
Waiting for him to acknowledge me, I tried to imagine in
which period he had fought and whose cause he had espoused. His
dress and weapons provided no real clue. They were less an at-
tachment to a time than a metaphor for a cause. After several
minutes, the Colored Crusader turned from the empty landscape
that so held his attention and focused his gaze on me.
The weariness of many battles showed in his well-weathered
face and in the remains of his dented and worn armor. He was a
relic, but a formidable one able to command respect with eyes that
were as bright as the polished metal of his sword. And somewhere
beyond the grime, deeper than the unhealed wounds, it was clear,
his determination remained strong.
Even before he spoke, I sensed that he had wandered through
the land for a long time, unseen while observing, monitoring, and
assessing the status of his race. He had been a silent sentry to this
longest crusade, but when he spoke his voice was strong and deep
and seemed to emanate from beyond his spare figure.
"The racial crusades arise from the same causes and share
the same ends. Each is born in the deep abuse and long suffering
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borne by a people whose oppression is made worse because carried
out in a land espousing equality. In each age, an unexpected occur-
rence engenders rage and inspires hope. The oppressed rise and
rededicate themselves to the cause of freedom and equality. The
struggles follow: there are victories, defeats, the inevitable casual-
ties, and at last, the seeming victory that becomes over time the
basis of a new subjugation."
Because I had discovered him or, more likely, the old warrior,
having allowed himself to be discovered, he seemed anxious to
talk. After my initial shock, I eagerly inquired what he might say
that would point some new way for a people whose enslavement
had taken so many forms while retaining its essential characteris-
tic: subordination on the basis of race.
The old man did not answer. Rather, he raised his staff and
with a grand, sweeping motion revealed for my vision a broad
landscape of history upon which he had long fixed his gaze. There
before me in panoramic presentation, I could see that the paradox
of American history was true. Slavery had provided the wealth
with which the nation gained its freedom.
For slavery provided the labor required to realize the wealth
in the new country's natural resources, in clearing the forests,
plowing the fields, cultivating and harvesting the crops. The
emancipation, when it came, advanced the interests first of the
northern emancipators and later provided indentured workers for
the southerners who had enslaved or profited from the enslave-
ment. Africans were free, but their status changed far more than
the actual conditions of their lives.
Emancipation came first in the North. The Revolutionary
War against England was won, and in many northern states, the
virtues of slavery had worn thin. Abolitionists, seeing their
chance, demanded its elimination. The response inevitably was,
"Certainly, slavery is an evil, but who will pay the slave owners?"
Eventually, a statutory scheme was devised which provided, in ef-
fect, that slaves purchase their own freedom.
Later, the change comes to the South. The Civil War ends,
and those who as a matter of morality wish to truly emancipate
the slaves, proclaim that "slavery was an evil, and the freedmen
must be compensated for their years in bondage so that they can
make their own way." Thaddeus Stevens and many others try for
years to translate the dream of "40 acres and a mule" into law.1
But this early attempt at affirmative action aimed at taking the




land from former slave owners is rejected. The nation cannot
bring itself to require even identifiable wrongdoers to compensate
Black people for this ultimate exploitation. Watching the tableau,
I am reminded of the contemporary arguments against affirmative
remedies for racial discrimination that rely on the claim that
wrongdoers are not identifiable. Over time, the arguments shift.
The outcomes do not change.
The pageant-like presentation continues to unfold. In the
post-Reconstruction era, the Emancipation Proclamation in a hos-
tile land that denies the freedmen both reparations for the past
and economic opportunity for the future becomes, to put it inele-
gantly but accurately, the largest unemployment act in history.
The enslavement of Africans as practiced in the North American
continent was abominable, but close to that awful state was the
resistance to allowing the former slaves to work and earn their
way. Indeed, the difference between the pre-Civil War years and
the post-Reconstruction decades was more in degree than in kind.
Here before me, there is visual proof of how short the long-sought
emancipation was to be.
In the South, after a brief period of Reconstruction-sponsored
economic growth and political influence, the freedmen are reduced
through threat and violence to a subjugated serfdom. Many mid-
west and even far west states had earlier barred both slaves and
free Blacks, fearing the economic competition of the former, and
abhorring the physical presence of the latter. Finally, the North,
as a sign that the Civil War enmity is ended, withdraws its protec-
tion and renounces its concern for a race whose soldiers in the
hundreds of thousands had fought to gain a freedom they had
hardly experienced.
To their credit, the betrayed millions survive. Generations
continue to hope, though by law they are excluded here, or sepa-
rated there, and exploited wherever they go. The constitutional
amendments, enacted to provide and protect their rights, are crip-
pled by judicial interpretations that combine hypocrisy with mean-
spiritedness. In this, the judiciary manages to equal the cruel
mockery of the founding fathers who sought to disguise the consti-
tutional slavery they provided by not mentioning the word "slave"
in the document.
The "separate but equal" standard,2 suspect on its face, is ad-
ministered across the land as a total denial of the "equal," and a
cruel enforcer of the "separate." And it is against this inequity
that leaders of this benighted group begin a new crusade. Working
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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with those of the oppressor class who are friendly to their cause,
they plan over many years still another campaign to overthrow the
old judicial interpretations and establish the equal protection of
the laws incorporated long ago in the fundamental law.
That campaign seemed vindicated on May 17, 1954, when the
Supreme Court recognized at last what so many of its victims had
long known. It was not the first, but the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education 3 sparked perhaps the most stirring of the pe-
riodic awakenings that, as the Colored Crusader put it, "inspire
hope, and a rededication to the cause of freedom." There followed
again "the struggles, the victories, the defeats, the inevitable casu-
alties, and at last, the overthrow of the old order that became over
time the basis of a new subjugation."
The panorama of history fades, and the image of the old
Crusader returns. He seems ready to return to his lonely vigil, but
asks me in a stern voice:
"You have now seen what you have long known. Is it clear
what you and others must do?"
It was anything but clear. I struggled to restate the question,
then remembered a letter from a former civil rights lawyer, Ge-
neva Crenshaw, who had phrased my question far better than I
ever could.4 I had been carrying her letter with me everywhere
hoping for some sudden inspiration that would enable me to ex-
plain the strange mixture of success for some and abject hopeless-
ness for so many others that characterize the Second
Reconstruction era. Geneva had observed:
[W]e have made progress in everything, yet nothing has
changed. It is incredible that our people's faith could have
brought them so much they sought in the law and left them
with so little they need in life.
It is unfair. Like the crusaders of old, we sought our
Holy Grail of "equal opportunity," and having gained it in
court decisions and civil rights statutes, found the quest to be
for naught. Equal opportunity, far from being the means of
achieving racial equality, has become yet another device for
perpetuating the racial status quo. Our cause was righteous,
but who can claim that we have prevailed?
I shared this letter with the Colored Crusader, and asked for
his counsel on where we might go from here. His response was
brief and more encouraging than enlightening.
"Go forward," he urged, "but do not advance without keeping
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).




clearly in mind the mistakes of the past. It is foreordained that
much that you accomplish will further the interests and well-being
of your opponents, but you should push on, trying to sustain some
gains for your people and never forgetting that the right does sur-
vive and will eventually prevail."
What indeed is the law reform lawyer to do with our history
and the Colored Crusader's advice? Our task is no longer the com-
paratively straightforward one of securing for all regardless of
race, color, and creed, those rights protected by the Constitution.
We have come to see, tardily but no less clearly, that the disadvan-
tages wrought by injustice, unfairness, and powerlessness, include
long-ignored economic components, and that meaningful reform of
any of these problems becomes ever more difficult as the imbal-
ance in the distribution of income grows larger and larger.
According to one study,5 the distribution of income to Ameri-
can families in 1983 provided the wealthiest two-fifths of those
families with 67.1 percent of the total national income received
(the highest since 1947, the year such data were first obtained). At
the other extreme, the poorest two-fifths of American families
earned only 15.8 percent of the national income. The poorest one-
fifth earned but 4.7 percent of the national income, in comparison
to the one-fifth at the top who earned 42.7 percent. The middle
one-fifth earned 17.1 percent.
For those lawyers with a special commitment to alleviating
racial injustice, these figures are particularly sobering. Nearly one-
half of all Black families have incomes that place them in the bot-
tom one-fifth (the group now receiving only 4.7 percent of the na-
tional income). 6 Despite the growing affluence of some, the
number of American families that have fallen into poverty has in-
creased since 1980, and 22 percent of those families are Black 7-
even though only 12 percent of the population is Black.8
I need not recite for this audience the dire significance of
Black and Brown unemployment on the structure of family life.
As another study defined the problem:
[T]he economic status of black adult men is the other, largely
unnoticed, side of the troubling increase in single-parent black
families. The absence of black men may be the key to the tre-
mendous growth in black female-headed families in recent
5. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Falling Behind: A Report on How
Blacks Have Fared Under the Reagan Policies 3 (1984).
6. Id.




years and the accompanying rise in poverty among black
families.9
This study found that of the Black male population between
the ages of sixteen and sixty-four, nearly half are either unem-
ployed, out of the labor force, in prisons, or their labor force status
cannot be determined by available data.10 On the other hand, of
white men in the same group, twenty-three percent are in a simi-
lar situation." The study prefaces the unemployment rate for
white males with "only." In the world's richest nation, the fact
that almost one-quarter of its working age men, not burdened by
the discrimination and stigma of race, are not gainfully employed
should constitute a problem of major importance.
History suggests that the white male unemployment rate
would be viewed as a crisis but for the presence of Blacks and
Browns who are measurably worse off. From an early time, poor
and working class whites have determined their status not in rela-
tion to upper-class whites, but in comparison with the great mass
of Blacks. Without this commitment to racial chauvinism, the sub-
ordination of Blacks and the less-well-off whites would not be
possible.
The meager forces still fighting the ongoing evil of racism
should not expect a new enlightenment among those whites who
would gain most from a cooperative effort with the people of color
they now despise and fear. But for the odd and continuing allure
of racial superiority, they would see themselves as they are, ex-
ploited and subjugated Blacks with white skins. One may hope
that the enlightenment comes, but in the meantime, we must press
on to help save those poor Blacks and Hispanics drowning in eco-
nomic hard times despite the presence on the books of more civil
rights laws than have ever existed in our history. As we aid people
of color by pushing for social reforms in the economic area, simi-
larly situated whites will also be helped, despite their resistance to
our efforts.
Society is so unbalanced as to opportunity, resources, and
wealth that any effort to bring about racial equality and justice for
a long-disadvantaged group collides with what Professor Martha
Minow calls the "dilemma of difference."12 That is, "relief" for
one unjust system often leads to the advocacy of another that con-
9. The Center for the Study of Social Policy, The Flip-Side of Black Female-
Head Families The Economic Status of Black Men, introduction (1984).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual
and Special Education, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. 157 (1985).
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tains important elements of disadvantage perhaps different in
kind, but no less damaging than those under the rejected struc-
ture.'3 For example, advocates of teaching handicapped children
in classes with normal children, while recognizing the interac-
tional advantages of such "mainstreaming," quickly realize the loss
of specialized techniques and equipment available in the special
classroom.
Those who argued the school segregation cases took the posi-
tion that the first Justice Harlan was right, that the Constitution
was, in fact, "colorblind;"'1 4 as the appellants' brief put it in 1953,
"Any distinction based upon race was understood as constituting a
badge of inferiority."l5 NAACP lawyers argued to the Supreme
Court that racial distinctions in and of themselves are invidious.
But in the matter of remedy, the long generations of systematic
exclusion from opportunities no longer barred by law, posed the
dilemma of difference in a particularly cruel form:
-If racial equality advocates settled for the removal of for-
mal racial barriers, the dead hand of past exclusion, combined with
the still strong desire to retain old, exclusionary results through
new and subtle practices, would perpetuate much of the racial sta-
tus quo.
-On the other hand, to urge remedial policies that take cog-
nizance of both the long-suffered disadvantages based on race as
well as the known but hard-to-prove devices by which discrimina-
tory practices are maintained, the greater or lesser reliance on race
that such classifications require is attacked as "reverse discrimina-
tion" that will do harm to "innocent whites."
I wonder whether affirmative action opponents who so stren-
uously assert the protection of rights of innocent whites recognize
the logical inconsistency in their positions that casts in doubt pre-
cisely those they are attempting to defend. In the standard for
proving discrimination set out by the Supreme Court almost a dec-
ade ago in Washington v. Davis ,16 no relief would be available in
the absence of a strong showing that the defendant's policy ad-
versely affected Blacks (fairly easy to do), and that the defendant
invidiously intended the policy to have that result.17 Where proof
of intentional discrimination was lacking, even a quite disparately
adverse impact of the policy on Blacks was insufficient to gain re-
13. Id. at 159, 202.
14. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15. Brief for Appellant at 34, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
17. Id. at 239.
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lief.18 Whites who benefited from the policy, at least when com-
pared to Blacks and Browns, continued to do so. Where proof of
intentional discrimination was provided, a remedy was appropriate
even when it interfered with rights or expectations of "innocent
whites."
Thus, under settled civil rights doctrine, so-called innocent
whites are either left as they are, or experience harm or disap-
pointment of expectations based entirely on the fortuities of proof
of wrongdoing by defendants, third parties over whom they have
no control. It is, moreover, entirely fanciful to suggest that these
whites are wrongfully benefiting from challenged policies when
proof of intentional discrimination is proved, but that their benefit
is merely coincidental when plaintiffs are unable to meet the stiff
proof standards now required by the Court.
But, you will say, the identification of such inconsistencies is
an interesting and totally predictable phenomenon in a system es-
pousing equality as ideology and practicing economic exploitation
of a character that each year places more and more of the nation's
wealth in fewer and fewer pockets. The question is, what, if any-
thing, can lawyers do to bring about real reform working through
courts and the Constitution?
Following the old Colored Crusader's advice to learn from
history, we know that public interest lawyers sought through test
litigation to establish constitutional protection for a broadened list
of fundamental rights including educaton, 19 decent shelter,20 and
adequate welfare payments. 21 Each of these efforts ended in de-
feat. In Dandridge v. Williams ,22 the welfare payments case, the
Supreme Court in refusing to invalidate a state-imposed maximum
grant limit on the amount of AFDC program aid a family could re-
ceive, despite family size, distinguished state regulation in the so-
cial and economic field from those affecting freedoms guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights.23 In tones of utter self-righteousness, Justice
Stewart promised not to repeat the erroneous forays into economic
interests that earlier had brought the Court to grief during the
Lochner 24 era. He explained:
For this Court to approve the invalidation of state economic or
social regulation [here] would be far too reminiscent of an era
18. Id. at 244-45.
19. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
20. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
21. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
22. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
23. Id. at 484.
24. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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when the Court thought the 14th Amendment gave it power to
strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, improvi-
dent, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. '25
The Court's intentions may have been honorable, but its un-
derstanding of what its half-century of economic support for big
business had achieved was amazingly shallow. For it was the
Supreme Court that in the 1880's, accepting the arguments of cor-
porate lawyers that the fourteenth amendment, enacted intitially
to provide citizenship and basic rights to those humans long en-
slaved, interpreted the fourteenth amendment to provide protec-
tion to corporations that were to be deemed "persons. ' 2 6
With their new-found constitutional status, the nation's larg-
est business enterprises were able to read the economic theories of
capitalism into the Constitution, fending off under the maxim of
"freedom of contract" the efforts by states to protect workers
against the often inhuman factory conditions under which they la-
bored long hours for little pay.
The original purpose of the fourteenth amendment, the
granting of citizenship rights to Blacks, was abandoned in order, as
Yale professor Boris Bittker put it, to nurture "railroads, utility
companies, banks, employers of child labor, chain stores, money
lenders, aliens, and a host of other groups and institutions . ..
leaving so little room for the Negro that he seemed to be the four-
teenth amendment's forgotten man."27
It required a major depression-one that threatened to de-
stroy the country's economy-before the Supreme Court re-
nounced its long commitment to the Lochner model. After all, the
Court finally realized, perhaps the wage earner did not stand on
parity with the factory owner when crucial matters of pay and
hours were negotiated.28 In fact, the Court and the country's in-
dustries discovered (though they did not admit) that corporate-
based wealth would be better protected if government were per-
mitted to play a regulatory as well as a subsidizing role. Thus it
was that a consensus was formed around the proposition that
workers should be protected as well as exploited under a system
where equality is a symbol and class-based privilege is a fact.
In determining that it would not in the future substitute its
25. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (citing Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
26. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
27. Boris Bittker, The Case of the Checker Board Ordinance: An Experiment in
Race Relations, 71 Yale L.J. 1387, 1393 (1962).
28. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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judgment for the legislature's beyond determining that the objects
of challenged enactments were reasonable, the Court did assure
"discrete and insular" minorities that it would scrutinize more
carefully state laws that allegedly infringed on civil rights pro-
tected by the Constitution.2 9
For the most part, the Court has kept this promise. During
the years when the racial violations brought to the Court for re-
dress were overt and blatant, we did not notice that the Court's de-
cisions would maintain the economic status quo. But judicial
recognition and enforcement of rights to nondiscriminatory treat-
ment served to entrench economic disparities in wealth and
power-in ways less direct, but no less effective than the Court's
post-Lochner decision to permit government to curb the worst
abuses of big business.
Consider the economic status quo-maintaining effect of the
desegregation decisions. To be sure, the Court's action lifted the
burden of official racial stigma from the backs of the nation's
Black and Brown people. As a result, in schools, job opportunities,
and politics, some Blacks, by combining talent, hard work, and
luck, are better off. But we cannot ignore the fact that the elimi-
nation of formal segregation alleviated the most openly grievous
aspect of the system without doing very much at all to enable the
victims of the segregation era to recover and make their way. The
"colored" or "white" signs have been gone so long that most stu-
dents, even law students, have never seen them, but except in min-
imal and grudging ways, there has been no modern equivalent of
40 acres and a mule.
Today, as you wander through the lobby of a better hotel or
are ushered to your table in a restaurant other than the fast food
category, how many Black and Brown faces do you see either
seated or serving? It is no different in corporate offices, banks,
government agencies, and institutions of higher education. People
of color are represented but in percentages far below even the
most conservative estimates of those NAACP delegates who gath-
ered in New York City for their national convention in 1959 under
the motto, "Free by 1963."
We were naive in those days. It could not have been many
years later when then-Governor Nelson Rockefeller brought a
group of civil rights workers to our feet cheering when he an-
nounced his commitment to open housing by proclaiming that
29. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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every person should be able to live where his heart desires and his
pocketbook permits.
Talk about the Lord gives, and the Lord taketh away. In
those days, our focus was on achieving heart's desires. We looked
on equal opportunity as our forebears had relied on the opportu-
nity inherent in 40 acres and a mule. Like them we assumed the
promise meant someone had answered the contemporary
equivalent of the old question: "And who will pay the slave
owner?" In fact, the question is still open.
As long as it remains unanswered, even those committed to
the traditional goals of civil rights lawyers and public interest liti-
gators will gain no more than short-term relief as they strive to
use the law and test cases as vehicles of social reform. Predictably,
whatever victories they achieve for their clients, the long-term re-
sults will serve the needs of the upper classes for stability, regular-
ity, and acceptance of the status quo by the poor.
Ironically, our enemies may be our liberators. Opponents to
the legitimate goals of Black and Brown people may do more by
their opposition to bring down the wrath of long-oppressed peoples
of color than anything we, particularly those of us who work in
the legal arena, can do through efforts linked to law and the judi-
cial process.
Consider for a moment if our nation's mortal enemies were
able to place an agent on the Supreme Court who would foment
revolution among the masses. How might this be accomplished?
Surely by waging a ceaseless campaign against the liberal orienta-
tion of civil rights and law reform decisions. The agent would op-
pose protections intended to shield the poor from the worst abuses
of the system, and would strive to reduce access to the Court by
those who lack the political and economic power required to have
their problems heard.
Strange. I wonder whether you share with me the perverse
sense that at least one member of the Supreme Court fits this tem-
plate beautifully. The best part of the disguise is that those in the
privileged classes who his judicial philosophy may bring down view
him as a savior, while civil rights advocates see him as the enemy
of the poor and the oppressed. Even so, the refusal to provide ba-
sic relief for serious misery may do more to provoke the oppressed
classes into necessary revolt than any advocacy by we who espouse
their cause.
Of course, neither the conservatives on the Supreme Court
nor the legions of them in the current administration view them-
selves as agents of revolutionary reform. Their simplistic rhetoric
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speaks in grand terms of a nation that never was and, if their plans
all come to fruition, never will be. Alas, those of us who are
thoughtful on the civil rights side are denied this bliss of
ignorance.
Perhaps too late, we recognize now that the chanting of talis-
manic phrases like "free by 1963" will not produce racial equality.
The legacy of the Brown decision has taught us that the exploited
can never obtain true compensation without altering the status of
those who exploit. Decrying the exploitation as evil and unconsti-
tutional is not enough. Equality cannot be obtained merely by en-
acting civil rights laws or winning cases in the courts. We know
that we will perpetuate rather than lessen injustice and depriva-
tion if we do no better than offer social programs that provide food
without nutrition, welfare without well-being, job training without
employment opportunities, and legal services without justice.
This is not to say government does not have an important
role in the future struggle for reform. Neo-conservative Blacks
gain easy access to the media to proclaim that racism is dead and
Blacks should make their own way without government help.
They act as though they discovered "self-help" when in fact doing
it on your own has long been the most important weapon in the
survival arsenal of people of color.
Moreover, the Black camp followers of the Reagan adminis-
tration have not read their history. The Black groups whose pro-
grams have most upset and threatened whites into vicious and
often violent retaliation-the Marcus Garvey movement, the Black
Muslims, and Black Panthers, the Republic of New Africa-all be-
lieved in self-help.
It is axiomatic in America that whites despise Blacks who,
broken by the racial oppression that fills their lives, surrender
hope and rely on welfare or crime to survive. But they fear those
Blacks who renounce whites and militantly determine they will
somehow make their way in this hostile land.
No, the government has a responsibility. As Diane Ravitch
has suggested, at the least, "the role of government must be to pro-
vide Blacks with the opportunity and the means to make choices
for themselves, because it was precisely this power to make deci-
sions that was denied to Blacks in the past." 30
The old Colored Crusader urged that we press on toward new
crusades. Clearly, the challenge for the near future is to establish
by political means if we can, by judicial interpretation if we must,
30. Diane Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of Meaning, in Shades of Brown:
New Perspectives on School Desegregation 31, 44 (Derrick Bell ed. 1980).
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a right to economic opportunity that guarantees a right to a job to
all who are able and wish to work at a decent salary under hu-
mane conditions.
Predictably, the advocacy of this new right will encounter ve-
hement opposition from those sources of wealth and power whose
long-vested property interests will best be insured by sharing some
of it with those who have nothing. They seem not to realize the
oft-repeated history lesson that the more they increase their
wealth at the expense of the poor, the greater the threat that they
will lose it all.
Thus do we liberal reformers protect those at the top of our
system from themselves. It is a high cost for the modicums of re-
form obtained. Crusades are not less crusades, however, when
they do not travel in lines that are straight and with logic that is
clear. We are foreordained to do harm when we think we do the
most good, and from our failures may come long-delayed triumph.
Thus, we must neither insist on victory nor fear defeat. Our duty
is the struggle itself.
It is as if I hear the old Crusader's voice, still strong and deep,
and emanating from somewhere beyond his weary figure. I cannot
see him, but that is not important. For when I looked on his face
back on that wintry hill, I saw my own. I suggest that if you see
him, you too will also see yourselves.
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